Self-determination

Taking a step back, it is a remarkable development of warfare from the classic Napoleonic battles to the slaughters of the first and second world wars. When looking for an explanation one has to look first and foremost at mass society, a common national identity and the concept of the nation state. But that wouldn’t make as good a story as one of the secondary causes. Back to the Franco-Prussian war: the Germans won the war relatively easily, but a debate sparked over a people’s right to defend itself.

The Germans at the time argued that war was a soldier’s business. Civilians live in a state, a state has an army and an army goes to war. Hence, when the army’s defeated, so is the state and it’s civilians. Easy-peasy. The more liberal Brits and French argued that state is an indivisible nation. War between nations cannot be reduced to a clash of armed forces; everyone’s involved. The people have a right to self-determination, a concept we still hold dear today.

The typically militaristic Germans lost the debate and didn’t like it one bit. In the First World War the Germans acted ruthlessly in Belgium and Northern France, more or less saying ‘okay, if the people are allowed to fight we shall treat them all as enemy soldiers.’ Thousands of ‘innocent’ civilians were killed. The Second World War would even take this further with the bulk of the 50 million casualties being civilian.

A self-destruct mechanism?

Should we call this form of war the result of the will of democratic nations under a mass society or should we call it total wars of destruction (rather than mere ‘military conquest’)? This right to self-determination is a beautiful weapon in debates on ideals and moral values, but when applied on the microscopic scale it has demonstrated horrible and gruesome effects. Are we better off with it than without it? Does Western liberal civilisation carry a self-destruct mechanism with it?

The unification of Germany

Otto von Bismarck, unlike many contemporaries, seemed to understand 19^th century Europe. Bismarck was a realpolitiker, a pragmatic politician—as opposed to the idealistic post-Napoleonic concert of Europe of the first half of the 19th century. For Bismarck there were only means and ends; war, government reforms and alliances were tools to protect German (read: Prussian) interest. This attitude is exemplified by Germany’s unification, to which arch-conservative Bismarck was strongly opposed—but in which he recognized the best strategy to keep Prussian liberals under control. But how does one unite some 19 different, independent states? In a diplomatic and political masterstroke Prussia…

• …had France declare war on it, making France look like the aggressor
• …had the other German states join them against a common enemy
• …humiliatingly crushed the French
• …bound the various German states, excluding Austria, together.
• …made the initially temporary German bond permanent
• …took control over the newly created German empire

The Prussian king was crowned German emperor and the new (in theory very democratic) constitution gave more or less absolute power to the kaiser and his ministers.

European diplomacy

Not the expansion of the new German empire but keeping it from isolation was Bismarck’s primary foreign policy objective. Bismarck maintained a complex set of alliances, based (with my personal, blunt hindsight) on two principles:

1. apart from the war over dominance in the German confederation, the Austro-Hungarian empire was a historical ally and German sister-state—but it was more of a strategic nuisance than an advantage;
2. a Franco-Russian alliance—encircling Germany— would choke Germany

These are illustrated by Bismarck’s take on the major European powers’ imperialistic urge to conquer every last bit of the globe in search for economic dominance:

Your map of Africa is really quite nice. But my map of Africa lies in Europe. Here is Russia, and here… is France, and we’re in the middle—that’s my map of Africa.

Life after Bismarck

Otto von Bismarck, the iron chancellor and the peace-keeper of Europe, was sacked by the young and inexperienced Kaiser Wilhelm II in 1890, emperor of Germany. Around this time Germany was allied with Russia, Italy and Austria while England and France were on the brink of war. Within 24 years Germany would find itself in a full-scale war on two fronts—arguably three fronts counting the Austro-Italian conflict—allied only to the imploding Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires. Peace would not return proper to Germany until 1989.

Otto von Bismarck did well in protecting Prussia, Germany and Europe from disaster. He failed in building the foundations for keeping it that way after he’d gone. I’m reluctant to call his influence good or bad, but it was definitely enormous.

Recommended reading

1. Otto von Bismarck at WikiPedia
2. Quotes by Otto von Bismarck at WikiQuote
3. Encyclopedia of 1848 Revolutions
4. Bismarck’s unification of Germany
5. Long 19th Century: European History from 1789 to 1917

Mostly because of the reconquista the development of Spanish society was out of synch with the rest of Europe. At the start of the 20th century Spain was a largely agricultural society with a handful of advanced industrial centres scattered across the country, most notably Barcelona and Madrid. During the First World War–in which it remained neutral–Spain saw a huge economic revival as it could trade with both the enténte and the central powers. Booming exports however did not improve working conditions in factories or at farm lands, and food was scarce. In 1917 labour unions called for general strikes across the country. It failed as the unions failed to mobilize rural workers.

Industrialisation and a highly inefficient agricultural system made for a severely skewed economy, dominated by great landowners and corrupt politicians. Most of the rural workers were starve close to starvation, while labour unions–the socialist UGT and anarchist CNT being the largest–enjoyed disproportionate power in urban areas. Many Spanish workers found hope in the Russian revolution, but workers’ increasing demands and militarisation was often violently oppressed by assassinations of union leaders, and military intervention.

The first half of the 20^th century in Spain is characterized by chaos, unrest and anger. Next up: the Spanish army.